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mary judgment claiming that the ex-
clusivity provision ofsection 15 of the 
Workers' Compensation Act barred 
Le's action. Section 15 states in 
pertinent part that «an employer's 
I iabil ity for payment of workers' com-
pensation provided for in this statute 
shall be the exclusive remedy." Id. at 
1069. Federated additionally argued 
that although section 44 of the Mary-
land Workers' Compensation Act pro-
vides an exception to the exclusivity 
rule by permitting common law ac-
tions against employers for deliberate 
torts, it did not apply to Le. Id. 
Federated cited Maryland case law for 
the proposition that an employee could 
sue only if the potential tort-feasor 
was the employer's «alter ego" or 
acted with its express authorization. 
Id. at 1 070 (citing Continental Casu-
alty Co. v. Mirabile, 449 A.2d 1176 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)). Feder-
ated argued that because Spahr was 
not its " alter ego," nor acting with its 
express authority, Le's only redress 
was governed by the terms of the Act. 
Accepting this interpretation, the cir-
cuit court granted Federated's mo-
tion. 
The court of special appeals re-
versed, stating that because Le's case 
involved non-physical injuries, it did 
not fall within the provision of the 
Workers Compensation Act. Id. The 
intermediate appellate court distin-
guished Le's case from earlier cases 
on the ground that the latter dealt with 
physical injuries while Le's injuries 
were non-physical, thereby allowing 
Le's action to proceed. Id. Federated 
appealed to the court of appeals which 
affirmed the intermediate court's de-
cision on different grounds. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by interpreting the appropri-
ate sections of the Workers' Compen-
sation Act. Id. at 1071. The court first 
reiterated the basic principal that sec-
tion 44 operates as an exception to the 
exclusivity requirement of section 15 
and provides that an employee shall 
have the " option to take benefits under 
article or sue where injury or death 
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results from the deliberate intention of Alexander & Alexander v. Evander & 
employer. " Id. (quoting Md. Ann. Assoc. , Inc.: COURT OF SPECIAL 
Code art. 101 § 44 (1985 & 1990 APPEALS VACATES STATE'S 
Supp.)). The court held that the prior LARGEST PUNITIVE AWARD. 
decisions of the court of special ap- Acting in accordance with a recent 
peals construed the section too nar- United States Supreme Court opinion, 
rowly by requiring that the tort-feasor the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
be the employer's « alter ego" or act land recognized in Alexander & 
with its express authority. Id. at 1072. Alexander v. Evander & Assoc. , Inc. " 
The court of appeals declined to 596 A.2d 687 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
adopt the " alter ego" test and allowed 1991), an opportunity to review 
Le to bring the common law suit. Id. Maryland's system of awarding puni-
In support of its broad application of tive damages. In holding that the 
section 44, the court cited decisions award in Alexander violated due pro-
which support an employee's right to cess, the court vacated the award and 
sue his employer for "some inten- remanded for retrial the issues of 
tional torts based on the employer's whether, and in what amount, puni-
vicarious liability for the conduct of a tive damages should have been ren-
co-employee." Id. at 1073-74. The dered. 
court, however, decl ined to define the B. Dixon Evander & Associates, 
parameters of the section 44 excep- Inc. (" Evander"), an insurance bro-
tion. Id. ker, secured medical malpractice in-
The court in Federated Depart- surance for doctors at the University 
ment Stores v. Le has significantly of Maryland Hospital with an insurer, 
broadened the interpretation of sec- Mutual Fire, whose underwriter was 
tion 44 causes of action and the exclu- Shand, Morahan and Co. (" Shand" ). 
sivity exception in the Maryland Work- Shand was a subsidiary of another 
ers' Compensation Act. In so doing, broker, Alexander & Alexander (" A 
the court aligned Maryland with the & A"). Evander and Shand had a 
majority of other jurisdictions which contract whereby Evander was to be 
have similar exclusivity provisions Shand's exclusive representative for 
and exceptions in their respective professional malpractice coverage. 
Workers' Compensation Acts. Mary- In order to obtain less expensive 
land employers are now subject to malpractice coverage, the hospital se-
increased liability for injuries to their cured A & A as its new exclusive 
employees. Potential plaintiffs may broker in 1985. This decision created 
now seek a common law action against a conflict with Shand's agreement to 
their employers for the deliberate ac- underwrite exclusively for A & A. 
tions of co-employees causing non- Aware of the conflict, Shand officials 
physical injury. In this respect, more refused to place any of the hospital's 
employers may have to defend them- insurance needs with its carrier except 
selves against claims arising from situ- through Evander. At trial, it was 
ations over which they have little revealed that A & A officials had 
control. Moreover, the small busi- pressured Shand officials to accept 
ness owner who, although able to hospital policies through A & A in 
exert some control over the situation, spite of Shand's promise to Evander. 
may not have the financial means to Evander claimed that A & A had 
afford the increased litigation costs of tortiously interfered with his contract 
actions now permitted. with Shand, thereby depriving him of 
commissions from that contract. 
- Steven B. Drucker Evander additionally alleged that A & 
A had conspired to harm his business 
reputation. Testimony at trial re-
vealed that an A & A vice-president 
had a personal dislike for Evander and 
that the official held a grudge against 
Evander and had vowed to put him out 
of business. The jury awarded 
$250,052 in compensatory damages 
to Evander against all defendants as 
well as $40 million in punitive dam-
agesagainstA&A. AlthoughEvander 
was also awarded $70,104 in punitive 
damages against Shand, he dismissed 
that claim. On A & A's motion, 
Baltimore City Circuit Judge Meyer 
Cardin reduced the punitive damages 
against A & A to $12.5 million, added 
to the compensatory damages, and left 
the rest of the verdict intact. 
A & A's appeal to the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland centered 
around the punitive damages award. 
Specifically, A & A complained that 
the award violated both federal and 
state requirements for due process of 
law, based on the amount of the award 
and the lack of relation to "proper 
standards." A & A premised its 
argument on the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. 
v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). 
In Haslip, the justices turned back 
a broad-based challenge to punitive 
damages, pointing out that they have 
" long been a part of traditional state 
tort law." Alexander, 596 A. 2d at 705 
(quoting Silkwood v. Kerr McGee, 
464 U.S. 238 (1984». The Court, 
however, did note that punitive dam-
age awards are subject to due process 
considerations and warned that states 
must provide sufficient standards to 
guide juries and judges in their deci-
sions on when punitive damages should 
be awarded. These standards, the 
Court opined, must include proper 
jury instruction and sufficient judicial 
review of the award. Alexander, 596 
A.2d at 705-06 (citing Haslip, 111 S. 
Ct. at 1044 (1991». The court took 
this opportunity to determine whether 
Maryland law on punitive damages 
complied with the implicit standards 
from Haslip: guidance for the jury's 
and the court's discretion and judicial 
review of jury verdicts. 
Because Maryland's highest court 
had never promulgated a list of stan-
dards for punitive damages, the court 
turned to Maryland case law to deter-
mine whether Maryland courts had 
ever articulated the principles of puni-
tive damages. The court concluded 
that the principles expressed in Mary-
land decisions were sufficient to guide 
juries and judges. The court first 
noted the court of appeals holding that 
punitive damages " are to punish the 
wrongdoer, to teach him not to repeat 
his wrongful conduct and to deter 
others from engaging in the same 
conduct," Alexander, 596 A.2d at 708 
(citing Wedeman v. City Chevrolet 
Co., 366 A.2d 7, 12 (1976». With 
regard to when a court is to impose 
such damages, the court noted another 
court of appeals decision in which 
punitive damages would be imposed 
only where there is " outrageous con-
duct." Id. at 708 (citing Nast v. 
Lockett, 539 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1988». 
As to judicial review of punitive 
damages, the court found that the 
circuit courts in Maryland have broad 
discretion to review jury verdicts for 
excessiveness. The court acknowl-
edged, however, that" [a)s a general 
rule in Maryland, 'the question of 
whether a verdict is excessive is not 
open on appeal,''' Id. at 709 (citing 
Continental Gas Co. v. Mirabile, 449 
A.2d 1176, 1184 (1982», and that the 
Maryland appellate courts have never 
tampered with the amount of an award. 
After reviewing Maryland proce-
dures for punitive damage awards and 
deeming them sufficient, the court 
recognized that Haslip required courts 
to look further. The court stated the 
following: 
[i)ffaced with a punitive award 
that was entered upon proper 
procedure but which nonethe-
less contravenes due process 
because it is all out of propor-
tion to both the harm caused 
and the perniciousness of the 
conduct, we could not, on the 
ground of judicial impotence, 
allow the unconstitutional 
award to stand. 
Id. at 710. Armed with the additional 
power of review extended by Haslip, 
the court analyzed the award against A 
& A. The court was troubled by the 
fact that Evander had not presented 
evidence of A & A's net wealth and 
ability to pay, and that the jury had not 
been advised of the punishment and 
deterrent purposes of punitive dam-
ages. 
Several other factors influenced 
the court's holding that the $12.5 
million punitive award against A & A 
violated due process. The court first 
pointed out that the award against A & 
A was the largest ever rendered by a 
Maryland court. The nearest in amount 
was $7.5 million awarded in Potomac 
Electricv. Smith, 558A.2d 768 (1989). 
In addition, the court believed the 
award to be far in excess of the actual 
harm caused to Evander. The court 
noted that the award was nearly fifty 
times the essentially liquidated com-
pensatory damages and observed that 
until the very end of the case, Evander 
himself had not sought more than $5 
million. 
Finall y, the court decided that A & 
A's conduct, while" opprobrious, .. 
. excessive, ill-motivated, and . . . 
stupid," did not rate" high on the scale 
of reprehensibility." Alexander, 596 
A.2d at 711. The court arrived at this 
conclusion after comparing A & A's 
case with Potomac Electric, where an 
electric utility had allowed a high 
voltage wire to remain downed in an 
area frequented by children, resulting 
in the electrocution of a child. The 
court in that case found that the utility 
company's wanton conduct justified a 
$7.5 million punitive award. Observ-
ing that A & A had neither endangered 
public health or safety nor engaged in 
I ife-threatening activity, the court held 
that the award did not comport with 
due process. Alexander, 596 A.2d at 
711. 
Following tradition, the court 
chose not to alter the award. While the 
court recognized that .. the occasion 
may arise where an appellate reduc-
tion may be the most appropriate solu-
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tion," it declined to find that situation 
in Alexander. Id. at 711. The court 
instead vacated the punitive award and 
remanded for retrial the questions of 
whether, and in what amount, A & A's 
conduct justified a punitive damages . 
award. The court also suggested spe-
cific instructions for the jury on re-
mand. 
The Alexander opinion provides 
fresh insight on how the Maryland 
state courts should determine punitive 
damages. Though the court deter-
mined that the standards set by case 
law were sufficient, it also acknowl-
edged that Maryland courts in the past 
may have limited themselves too much 
in reviewing punitive damage awards. 
With the Haslip decision in mind, the 
court in Alexander gave appellate courts 
a green light for considering due pro-
cess when examining punitive damage 
awards. 
The Alexander case also serves to 
remind attorneys and judges of the 
importance of jury instructions for 
punitive damage awards. Juries must 
be told that punitive damages serve to 
punish wrongdoers and deter others 
from similar conduct. Juries need to 
be aware of the standards for actual 
malice and other factors, such as the 
wrongdoer's net worth and ability to 
pay in order to make an informed 
decision. 
- Catherine E. Head 
embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 
801 (d) (2) (0) and abandoned the tradi-
tional common law approach which 
required" speaking authority" before 
the statement was considered an ad-
mission of the principal. 
B & K Rentals and Sales Co. (liB 
& K") stored equipment used in its 
business of renting scaffolding and 
seating for public gatherings in a por-
tion of a warehouse owned by U niver-
sal Leaf Tobacco Co. (" Universal "). 
B & K brought an action for damages 
against Universal, contending that the 
negligence of Universal and its em-
ployees caused a fire which resulted in 
a substantial amount of damage to B & 
K's equipment. Only two Universal 
employees were present and working 
at the warehouse on the day of the fire, 
one of whom died in the fire. B & K 
never deposed or subpoenaed the sur-
viving employee, Leonard Grimes. 
The parties disputed both the avail-
ability of the surviving employee as a 
witness and B & K's efforts to locate 
him at the time of the trial. 
The case turned on the testimony 
of an expert witness, Lieutenant Ken-
neth J. Klasmeier, a fire investigator 
with the Anne Arundel County Fire 
Department. Lt. Klasmeier based his 
testimony on a written report he re-
ceived from another Anne Arundel 
Fire Department Investigator, Lieu-
B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. tenant James Stallings. Lt. Stallings 
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. : MARY-based his report, regarding his inves-
LAND ABANDONS SPEAKING tigations of the origin and cause of the 
AUTHORITY REQUIREMENT fire, primarily on Grimes' statements 
AND" RES GESTAE" APPROACH at the scene of the fire. Grimes told 
AND BINDS PRINCIPAL BY Lt. Stallings that: 
AGENT'SSTATEMENTSPURSU- 1) Johnson and he were the 
ANT TO F.R.E. 80Hd)(2l(D). only two people working at 
In B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. the warehouse at the time of 
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 596 A.2d the fire; 
640 (Md. 1991), the Court of Appeals 2) Grimes had lit an acetylene 
of Maryland held that a statement of a torch for Johnson a couple of 
party opponent's agent, which con- hours before the fire; 
cerns a matter within the scope of 3) Johnson was using the torch 
agency or employment and is made to burn strings caught in the 
during the existence of that relation- jack wheels of a wooden dolly; 
ship, may constitute an admission by 4) Grimes heard a popping 
the party opponent. By so ruling, the noise and saw smoke coming 
court of appeals adopted the principle from the area where Johnson 
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had just finished burning the 
string from the jack wheels; 
and 
5) Grimes believed the cause 
of the fire was related to 
Johnson's use of the acetylene 
torch ... 
Id. at 641. 
The trial court excluded both 
Stallings' and Klasmeier's reports. 
The court ruled that the reports were 
inadmissible because each relied on 
Grimes' hearsay statements, and nei-
ther qualified as admissions of a party 
opponent or as part of the res gestae 
exception. Id. at 642. The court of 
special appeals affirmed. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted cer-
tiorari to consider the laws under 
which evidence of admissions of party 
opponents were admissible. 
The court began its analysis by re-
examining the development of 
Maryland's case law on vicarious ad-
missions. The court noted that Mary-
land courts traditionally implemented 
an evidentiary standard based on 
agency law. Under this traditional 
test, the court required an agent to 
have" speaking authority" before his 
statements qualified as an admission 
of the principal. Id. at 643 (citing 
Brown v. Hebb, 175 A. 602, 607 (Md. 
1934». 
The court recognized the prob-
lems inherent in the application of the 
traditional test of agency law as an 
evidentiary standard. The court 
pointed out that the narrow formula of 
admissibility under the traditional test 
was problematic because it" frequently 
caused courts to exclude the agent's 
highly probative statement on the 
theory that the employer had not au-
thorized the agent to make damaging 
remarks about him ... Id. at 643. (quot-
ing 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence, § 801(d)(2) 
(0)[01] at 219 (1988». 
The court next considered 
Maryland's expansion of the tradi-
tionally narrow formula of admissibil-
ity through the adoption of the res 
gestae exception to the hearsay rule. 
